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ABSTRACT
Chevron skepticism is in vogue in legal academia, as Professors
Shoba Wadhia and Christopher Walker’s recent entry in the genre
demonstrates. They place their project within the broader academic
trend of arguing for limitations on the application of deference to
various administrative decisions, but their aim is ultimately narrower—
to show that “this case against Chevron has . . . its greatest force when
it comes to immigration.”
The Professors are incorrect. Immigration adjudication presents
one of the strongest cases for deference to administrative adjudication.
This case is founded in the text of the statute itself and its myriad general
and specific delegations of authority to the Attorney General, the
expertise of the agency which has honed its interpretive enterprise
through adjudicating tens of thousands of cases annually, and the
ultimate political accountability of the agency head in immigration
adjudication. For these reasons, the Supreme Court has applied
Chevron deference to immigration adjudications since the very
foundation of that framework. Although they advance an interesting
contrarian thesis, the Professors ultimately provide no sound basis for
retreating from four decades of established jurisprudence.
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INTRODUCTION
In a recent article, published as part of Duke Law Journal’s annual
Administrative Law Symposium, Professors Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia
and Christopher Walker argue that Chevron deference should not be
applied to immigration adjudications, specifically, the decisions of the
Board of Immigration Appeals. 1 This is a provocative thesis, contrary
as it is to nearly four decades of federal court decisions, including
repeated affirmations of Chevron’s applicability to immigration
adjudications by the Supreme Court. 2 It is sure to prompt further
debate in academia, as well as the federal courts, and to the extent it
forces all interested parties to reconsider the justifications for and
application of deference principles, it will be an important article. 3
If the article has a fundamental shortcoming, however, it is
perspectival: the Professors write largely from outside the system they
are critiquing. That does not undercut the strength that many of their
points carry, but it does provide an opening for a riposte from within
the system. Having litigated the Chevron issue for the government in
the immigration context before both the federal courts of appeals and
the Supreme Court, my views differ significantly both in how the
justifications for deference are framed and with the bottom-line
conclusion that adjudications should categorically be denied deference.

1. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia & Christopher J. Walker, The Case Against Chevron
Deference in Immigration Adjudication, 70 DUKE L.J. 1197 (2021). The removal proceeding is the
proceeding held before an immigration judge to determine a noncitizen’s removability from the
United States, as well as any eligibility for relief or protection from removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a
(2018) (providing the statutory authority and framework for the conduct of removal proceedings);
see also Patrick J. Glen, Judulang v. Holder and the Future of 212(c) Relief, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
1, 4 (2012) (providing a historical overview of removal proceedings). The immigration judge
conducts the removal proceeding in the first instance, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1), with the Board
of Immigration Appeals exercising appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of immigration
judges, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3) (2021) (providing the bases for appellate jurisdiction).
2. See Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41, 56 (2014) (applying Chevron deference
to uphold a decision of the Board); Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583, 591 (2012) (same).
3. See, e.g., Amaya v. Rosen, 986 F.3d 424, 438 n.1 (4th Cir. 2021) (Richardson, J.,
dissenting) (noting the article and its argument that Chevron deference should not apply to
immigration adjudications, while opining that Chevron must still be applied as a matter of
precedent).
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On my account, I would place significant weight on Congress’s
delegations to the Attorney General in the Immigration and
Nationality Act and the background principle of plenary power, which
may be weakened in its contemporary form but is far from dead. Even
assuming deference must be justified with resort to principles beyond
Congress’s explicit delegations, immigration adjudications pass that
bar: such adjudications are the poster child for political accountability,
as the Attorney General sits at the apex of the adjudicatory
bureaucracy, and the agency possesses both the craft and legislative
expertise that the Professors view as integral to the agency’s decisionmaking process. Finally, it is important to note that rulemaking—the
Professors’ preferred avenue for immigration policy-making—and
adjudication often serve different purposes, a point with special
importance under the INA, a statute that makes clear those
circumstances where Congress mandated rulemaking and those where
the agency has a freer hand to choose the method for implementing
policy. The agency should be entitled to deference regardless of the
path it chooses, so long as its decision is otherwise reasonable.
Part I begins by placing the Chevron issue in context. Although
the immigration bureaucracy is a sprawling system of adjudication
encompassing hundreds of thousands of adjudications each year before
both immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals,
Chevron deference is concerned only with the vanishingly small
minority of cases in which the Board issues a precedential decision
interpreting an ambiguous provision of the INA. And in that small
minority of cases, the decision-making of the Board is robust and
comprehensive. Part II then proceeds to the meat of the issue, arguing
that Chevron deference to immigration adjudications is appropriate.
This section addresses the main points already highlighted above: the
explicit general and specific statutory delegations to the Attorney
General and the background principle of the Executive Branch’s
plenary power in immigration; the political accountability in
immigration adjudication via the Attorney General’s referral
authority; and the significant institutional expertise the Board brings
to bear in resolving cases through precedent-setting adjudications. Part
III argues that there is no substantial reason to prefer rulemaking to
adjudication when it comes to affording deference to the agency’s
determinations, while highlighting the complementary roles each often
plays in the development and promulgation of policy. Finally, Part IV
turns to the Professors’ recommendations for reform, while posing the
question of what effect, if any, would Chevron’s recalibration have in
immigration cases?
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I. PLACING CHEVRON IN CONTEXT: IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATIONS
AND THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS’ DECISIONAL PROCESS
Professors Wadhia and Walker lay out at some length the
structure of the immigration adjudicatory system and its operational
realities. 4 Rather than retread that ground, it is worthwhile to address
two additional points that are especially relevant for addressing the
Chevron question: the scope of Chevron’s potential applicability to
immigration adjudications, and the decisional process the Board
engages in when issuing decisions entitled to Chevron deference.
First, Chevron’s potential scope. The immigration adjudication
system is massive, encompassing 65 immigration courts and 529
immigration judges, 5 as well as the Board of Immigration Appeals, an
appellate body that now has 23 permanent members. 6 In 2020,
immigration courts received 367,038 new cases, completed 231,435, and
ended the year with a backlog of 1,256,954 cases. 7 In the same year, the
Board received 51,300 new appeals, resolved 33,974 appeals, and ended
the year with 84,769 appeals pending. 8 Such a high workload may, from
a 30,000-foot view, lend credence at the threshold to an argument that
deference is not appropriate to immigration adjudications. Professor
Wadhia and Walker hint at this argument throughout their article,
noting not only high caseloads but also certain variances in case
outcomes based on which immigration court is conducting the
proceeding and whether the alien is represented. 9 These factors may
undercut the contention that deference is warranted because they point
to a system that is incapable of engaging in the type of reasoned

4. See Wadhia & Walker, supra note 1, at 1204–13.
5. See Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) Immigration Court Listing, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST., EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/immigration-courtadministrative-control-list [https://perma.cc/3LD5-KVPW] (last updated Aug. 2, 2021); U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST., EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., ADJUDICATION STATISTICS: IMMIGRATION
JUDGE
(IJ)
HIRING
(2021),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1242156/download
[https://perma.cc/8HQB-B57N].
6. See Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV.,
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals-bios [https://perma.cc/5HPB-FZX2]
(last updated July 19, 2021).
7. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., ADJUDICATION STATISTICS:
PENDING
CASES,
NEW
CASES,
AND
TOTAL
COMPLETIONS
(2021),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1242166/download [https://perma.cc/9QMQ-4N3X].
8. EOIR, Adjudication Statistics, Case Appeals Filed, Completed, and Pending, U.S. DEP’T
JUST. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1248501/download
[https://perma.cc/3QRT-7WYZ] (last updated July 8, 2021).
9. See Wadhia & Walker, supra note 1, at 1228–30.
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adjudication that should undergird a decision claiming entitlement to
deference. 10
For that reason, it is worthwhile drilling down through the system
to focus on that narrow class of decisions—out of the hundreds of
thousands of cases that will be resolved by immigration judges and the
Board in any given year—for which the question of Chevron deference
would be a live issue. Deference applies only when the adjudicator
“acts in its lawmaking capacity and, in the case of the BIA’s
adjudications, that means only when the BIA’s decision is binding
precedent within the agency.” 11 The Board’s decision is binding as
precedent only in circumstances where the Board issues a published
decision, 12 and that occurs only rarely in any given year. In 2020, the
Board issued 25 precedential decisions, a number on par with its
average yearly output over the last eight years: 16 (2019), 23 (2018), 27
(2017), 26 (2016), 28 (2015), 29 (2014), 19 (2013). 13 It is this class of
cases—representing .07% of the total decisions issued in 2020—that is
relevant for Chevron purposes. But even this calculation overstates the
universe of cases to which the government may ultimately seek
deference. Although the Board may issue a precedential decision on
any issue, and although that decision will bind agency adjudicators in
the discharge of their responsibilities, many of these cases will not be
entitled to deference before the courts of appeals. For instance, in cases
where the Board decides on the divisibility of state criminal statutes or
whether such a statute is a categorical match to the generic federal
offense, 14 the decision will not be entitled to deference before the
courts of appeals even though the decision is a precedential decision
that binds agency adjudicators. This is because the Board is held to
have no particular expertise on state criminal laws, and because the
categorical approach implicates a legal analysis to which deference is

10. See id.
11. Flores-Molina v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1150, 1157 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Rangel-Perez
v. Lynch, 816 F.3d 591, 597 (10th Cir. 2017)).
12. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2021).
13. See Agency Decisions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV.,
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/ag-bia-decisions [https://perma.cc/BJ8H-JXYQ] (listing the Board's
precedential decisions for each volume) (last updated Sept. 8, 2021).
14. See, e.g., Matter of Nemis, 28 I. & N. Dec. 250 (BIA 2021) (adjudicating application of
the categorical approach to the federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, and a visa-fraud
provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a)); Matter of Dikhtyar, 28 I. & N. Dec. 214, 214–16 (BIA 2021)
(addressing the divisibility of the Utah state drug schedules by specific controlled substance);
Matter of P-B-B-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 43 (BIA 2020) (addressing the divisibility with regard to
Arizona’s criminalization of possession of a “dangerous drug”).

2021]

THE CASE FOR CHEVRON

23

not relevant. 15 For present purposes, it is enough to note that the
universe of Chevron-eligible decisions in the immigration context is
exceedingly narrow, and implicates less than one-tenth of one percent
of all Board decisions issued in any given year.
Second, a corollary of the first point, the decisional-process
undergirding the issuance of a precedential decision is more intensive
and deliberative than issuance of single-member decisions.
Precedential decisions are only issued in cases where the Board has sat
as a three-member panel or en banc, and the decision may only be
issued as a precedent where the entire Board membership discusses the
case and votes in the affirmative to issue it as such. 16 In this sense, every
Board decision is essentially en banc—no precedent issues unless a
majority of the Board members believes it should be so issued. In this
way, the work of the Board parallels that of the federal courts of
appeals. The Ninth Circuit may issue only a handful of precedential
decisions in any given week, while issuing 100 unpublished
memorandum dispositions. 17 Nobody would allege that a published
opinion issued by the Ninth Circuit is somehow lacking in relative
deliberative processes just because the court also issued 20 or more
unpublished decisions the same day. What matters for assessing the
adequacy of deliberation is the case at issue, and for the Board and
Chevron purposes, the vanishingly small number of precedential
decisions it issues in a year, not the thousands of other orders and
decisions it will reach.

15. See, e.g., Omargharib v. Holder, 775 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 2014) (“Although we
generally defer to the BIA’s interpretations of the INA, where, as here, the BIA construes statutes
[and state law] over which it has no particular expertise, its interpretations are not entitled to
deference.” (alteration in original) (quoting Karimi v. Holder, 715 F.3d 561, 566 (4th Cir. 2013)));
Ramos v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 709 F.3d 1066, 1069 n.2 (11th Cir. 2013) (“We owe no Chevron
deference to the Board’s interpretation of the Georgia [criminal] statute, which the Board has no
power to administer.”); Denis v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 633 F.3d 201, 208 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[I]f the issue
turns on the meaning of a federal statute other than the INA, we possess the requisite expertise
to interpret a federal criminal statute such that no deference is due.” (citation omitted)); see also
Almeida v. Holder, 588 F.3d 778, 785 (2d Cir. 2009) (deferring to the BIA’s interpretation of
“theft offense,” but reviewing questions of a particular crime defined by state law de novo).
16. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2021).
17. For March 15, 2021, for instance, the Ninth Circuit issued 21 unpublished decisions and
3 published decisions. See Log of Unpublished Dispositions, U.S. CT. FOR NINTH CIR.,
https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/memoranda [https://perma.cc/B23P-8Z9X] (last visited Oct. 7,
2021); Opinions, U.S. CT. FOR NINTH CIR., https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/opinions
[https://perma.cc/8ST8-G668] (last visited Oct. 7, 2021). On March 12, 2021, when it issued no
published decisions, it issued 13 unpublished decisions. See Log of unpublished Dispositions, U.S.
CT. FOR NINTH CIR., https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/memoranda [https://perma.cc/B23P-8Z9X]
(last visited Oct. 7, 2021).
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II. THE CASE FOR CHEVRON DEFERENCE
When a court is confronted with an issue resolved by the Board in
a precedential decision, it should afford deference to that resolution
under familiar principles of Chevron deference. This deference stems
from the statute’s own explicit delegations to the Attorney General,
coupled with background principles of judicial deference to the
Executive Branch in immigration matters, the political accountability
the agency enjoys in the course of discharging its adjudicatory
functions, and its comparative expertise in the immigration issues
subject to adjudication. Although Professors Wadhia and Walker
attempt to cast doubt on the legitimacy of these justifications for
deference in the immigration context, their arguments are ultimately
misguided.
A. Explicit Delegations and Structural Cues
The “statutory” case for Chevron deference in immigration
adjudications is simple and straightforward. The INA broadly provides
the Attorney General with authority to “establish . . . regulations,
prescribe such forms of bond, reports, entries, and other papers, issue
such instructions, review such administrative determinations in
immigration proceedings, delegate such authority, and perform such
other acts as [he] determines to be necessary for carrying out this
section.” 18 The Act also provides that the Attorney General’s
“determination and ruling . . . with respect to all questions of law shall
be controlling.” 19 These grants of authority are important markers for
Chevron purposes, as they represent “express congressional
authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication
that produces regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed.” 20
Beyond the broad delegations framing the Attorney General’s
authority under the INA as a whole, the statute contains many more
specific, express delegations of authority. For instance, the INA
delegates to the Attorney General the authority for establishing
procedures for consideration of asylum applications, provides
authority to establish mandatory bars to eligibility and other conditions
for consideration of such applications, and uses open-ended
terminology that allows for interpretation by Executive Branch

18.
19.
20.

8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2).
8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1).
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
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adjudicators and rule-makers. 21 And the INA otherwise tends towards
broad and general language for key points that necessitates
interpretation by the Attorney General, whether that pertains to what
is encompassed by the term “public charge,” 22 how “good moral
character” should be assessed, 23 or what offenses fall within the
parameters of crimes of “domestic violence, stalking, and child
abuse,” 24 to offer only a few examples. The point is that the statutory
framework established by Congress not only explicitly delegates broad
authority to the Attorney General to resolve both general and specific
interpretive issues, but almost invariably uses language that invites
resolution through interpretation.
The Supreme Court has itself based its decisions extending
Chevron deference to immigration adjudications on this statutory
framework. In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. CardozaFonseca, 25 the Court recognized that although there will still be strictly
legal questions to which deference will not apply, there are also
statutory ambiguities in the INA “which can only be given concrete
meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication,” and in the
process of filling the gaps, the courts “must respect the interpretation
of the agency to which Congress has delegated the responsibility for
21. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(1) (“The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for the
consideration of asylum applications filed under [this section].”); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(B) (“The
Attorney General may provide by regulation for any other conditions or limitations on the
consideration of an application for asylum not inconsistent with this chapter.”); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(2)(B)(ii) (“The Attorney General may designate by regulation offenses that will be
considered to be a [disqualifying crime for purposes of asylum eligibility].”); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(2)(C) (“The Attorney General may by regulation establish additional limitations and
conditions, consistent with this section, under which an alien shall be ineligible for asylum under
paragraph (1).”). See generally Patrick J. Glen, In re L-A-C-: A Pragmatic Approach to the Burden
of Proof and Corroborating Evidence in Asylum Proceedings, 35 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 34 (2020)
(“The asylum statute . . . does not generally mandate specific procedures for the consideration of
asylum applications. Rather, that section is composed almost entirely of explicit and implicit
delegations.”).
22. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(4), 1227(a)(5) (stating public charge ground of inadmissibility
and deportability, respectively); see also Field Guidance on Deportability and Inadmissibility on
Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,689, 28,691 (Mar. 26, 1999) (providing public guidance
as to how the Immigration and Naturalization Service would apply the public charge grounds of
removability); Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292, 41,315 (Aug. 14,
2019) (revising the Executive Branch’s interpretation of the public charge inadmissibility ground).
23. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (listing per se categories that would involve a finding that the alien
lacked good moral character, but allow the Attorney General discretion to conclude that aliens
outside those categories also lack good moral character); see, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(B)
(requiring good moral character in order to establish eligibility for cancellation of removal).
24. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i); see also Matter of Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I. & N. Dec.
503, 504 (BIA 2008) (interpreting this provision).
25. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
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administering the statutory program.” 26 The Court clarified its
rationale for applying Chevron to immigration adjudications in INS v.
Aguirre-Aguirre. 27 Given that the INA explicitly provided that the
“determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all
questions of law shall be controlling,” 28 the Court deemed it “clear that
principles of Chevron deference are applicable” to immigration
adjudications. 29 In Aguirre-Aguirre, the Court found further support in
the statute’s specific conferral of “decisionmaking authority on the
Attorney General” in determining an alien’s eligibility for withholding
of removal, 30 as well as its prior recognition “that judicial deference to
the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration
context where officials ‘exercise especially sensitive political functions
that implicate questions of foreign relations.’” 31
These latter two points should be emphasized. First, the statute
broadly provides authority to the Attorney General to interpret the
statute he is charged with administering, while containing numerous
other delegations of decisional authority akin to what the Supreme
Court found compelling in Aguirre-Aguirre, including provisions
relating to asylum, cancellation of removal, adjustment of status, and
numerous other waivers and additional forms of relief or protection
from removal. 32 In other words, the INA is not a statute where courts
must discern whether there is an implied or implicit delegation of
authority to resolve statutory ambiguity; Congress has provided its
explicit instruction that the Attorney General’s determinations, made
in the course of discharging his responsibilities and decision-making
authority under the INA, should be given “controlling” weight. 33
Second, judicial deference in the immigration context must be
placed within the history of Executive authority over immigration; the
Executive’s authority stems not only from the statutory scheme, but
26. Id. at 448 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
27. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424–25 (1999).
28. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1).
29. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424.
30. Id. at 424–25.
31. Id. at 425 (quoting Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988)).
32. See Patrick J. Glen, Interring the Immigration Rule of Lenity, 99 NEB. L. REV. 533, 560–
61 n.191 (2021) (noting that “[t]he statute is . . . replete with express delegations of decisional
authority to the Attorney General,” and citing examples relating to asylum, cancellation of
removal, and other forms of relief).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (“We have recognized a
very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment in express congressional
authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations
or rulings for which deference is claimed.”).
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constitutes a background principle inherent in the nature of
immigration law. In 1950, the Supreme Court noted that “[w]hen
Congress prescribes a procedure concerning the admissibility of aliens,
it is not dealing alone with a legislative power. It is implementing an
inherent executive power.” 34 In Fiallo v. Bell, 35 the Supreme Court
opined that its cases “have long recognized the power to expel or
exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the
Government’s political department largely immune from judicial
control.” 36 This simply restated what it had said a year earlier in
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong 37: “the power over aliens is of a political
character and therefore subject only to narrow judicial review.” 38 For
this reason, the Supreme Court has traditionally, and even still,
extended broad deference to the Executive’s immigration-related
decisions because of the specific context of immigration law.
Beyond these principles, subsequent decisions of the Supreme
Court have focused on the specific expertise of the agency in resolving
complicated issues of immigration law, as well as the policy-oriented
disposition of certain issues that permissibly rests with the agency. For
instance, Justice Kagan recently described an immigration case as
[T]he kind of case Chevron was built for. Whatever
Congress might have meant . . . it failed to speak clearly.
Confronted with a self-contradictory, ambiguous
provision in a complex statutory scheme, the Board
chose a textually reasonable construction consonant
with its view of the purposes and policies underlying
immigration law. 39
And in the related context of the ordinary remand-rule, the Court
used agency expertise as a rationale for remanding to the agency rather
than a court of appeals to address legal or statutory interpretation
questions in the first instance. 40

34. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (emphasis added).
35. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
36. Id. at 792 (citation omitted).
37. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
38. Id. at 101 n.21 (citation omitted).
39. Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41, 75 (2014) (plurality opinion).
40. See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 523 (2009) (explaining that remand rules exist, in
part, “because ‘ambiguities in statutes within an agency’s jurisdiction to administer are
delegations of authority to the agency to fill the statutory gap in reasonable fashion. Filling these
gaps . . . involves difficult policy choices that agencies are better equipped to make than courts.’”
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This history provides a firm foundation for Chevron’s application.
Congress has explicitly delegated authority to the Attorney General,
including to conduct adjudications under the INA, and this delegation
bolsters an inherent Executive authority in the immigration context.
Add to that the expertise the agency has in its sole subject matter focus,
and it is little wonder that deference has been applied to immigration
decisions continually since the advent of Chevron.
B. Political Accountability and Attorney General Referral
Immigration adjudication, perhaps more than any other form of
contemporary agency adjudication, offers exactly the type of political
accountability that should underpin Chevron deference. The
Professors argue that two types of political accountability should be
relevant for administrative purposes, an “elections matter” conception
that advances the “electoral accountability in the administrative state,”
and a “deliberative accountability” that is centered on participatory
goals, including obtaining the views of affected or interested parties. 41
The Professors only make the conclusory assertion that
“[p]olicymaking through adjudication may not be an adequate
substitute for rulemaking under an ‘elections matter’ accountability
theory,” seemingly basing this contention on a comparison of
adjudication versus rulemaking rather than the inherent lack of
political accountability in immigration adjudication. 42 Regarding
deliberative shortcomings, they rely on purported shortcomings in the
decisional process of the Attorney General on review. The Professors’
concerns are overblown, and that political accountability is certainly
present in the immigration system.

(quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n. v. Brand X Int. Serv., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005)). Justice
Kennedy also noted that on remand,
[t]he agency’s interpretation of the statutory meaning of “persecution” may be
explained by a more comprehensive definition, one designed to elaborate on the term
in anticipation of a wide range of potential conduct; and that expanded definition in
turn may be influenced by how practical, or impractical, the standard would be in terms
of its application to specific cases. These matters may have relevance in determining
whether its statutory interpretation is a permissible one.
Id. at 524; see also Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186–87 (2006) (per curiam) (noting that on
remand, “[t]he agency can bring its expertise to bear upon the matter; it can evaluate the evidence;
it can make an initial determination . . . it can, through informed discussion and analysis, help a
court later determine whether its decision exceeds the leeway that the law provides” (quoting
Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 17 (2002) (per curiam))).
41. See Wadhia & Walker, supra note 1, at 1231–32 (citations omitted).
42. See id.
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The Attorney General is, under the text of the statute, the chief
administrator of the INA. 43 The Board acts only as his delegate, and
only within the context in which he has delegated his authority to the
Board to act. 44 As the Attorney General’s delegate, the Board must
still exercise its own independent judgment, 45 and its decisions are
deemed its own and not attributable to the Attorney General. 46
Moreover, a corollary to the regulatory requirement that the Board’s
decisions are a reflection of its own independent judgment, the
Attorney General may not attempt to influence or dictate the decisions
of the Board. 47 But the regulations do safeguard the Attorney
General’s fundamental role in immigration adjudication, by permitting
him to decide cases he opts to refer to himself, or in which the Board
or the Department of Homeland Security requests his review. 48 This
mechanism allows the Attorney General to decide both discrete issues
and broader questions of law through adjudication, and means that
“the Attorney General is the final arbiter of the immigration agency’s
interpretation of a statute.” 49
Exercise of this authority fits squarely with the “elections matter”
conception of Executive Branch accountability. 50 The Trump
Administration Attorneys General utilized the authority to implement
an immigration policy that tracked with what the campaign promised
it would do, a policy implementation that followed the election
returns. 51 Likewise, I have recently argued that the Biden
43. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a), (g).
44. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1) (1958) (“The Board shall function as an appellate body
charged with the review of those administrative adjudications under the Act that the Attorney
General may by regulation assign to it.”); see also Delegation of Powers and Definition of Duties,
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 5 Fed. Reg. 2454, 2454 (July 1, 1940) (“[T]he Board of
Review of the Immigration and Naturalization Service shall have authority to exercise the powers
of the Attorney General [in certain delineated cases].”).
45. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) (“Board members shall exercise their independent
judgment and discretion in considering and determining the cases coming before the Board.”).
46. See Tefel v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 608, 613 n.1 (S.D. Fl. 1997) (“[T]he decision of the BIA
is not factually, nor legally, the decision of the Attorney General.”).
47. See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266–67 (1954) (“[T]he
word ‘discretion’ means that the recipient must exercise his authority according to his own
understanding and conscience. In short . . . the Attorney General denies himself the right to
sidestep the Board or dictate its decision in any manner.”).
48. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h).
49. Sanchez-Penunuri v. Longshore, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1149 (D. Colo. 2013).
50. See Wadhia & Walker, supra note 1, at 1232.
51. See Patrick J. Glen, Robert F. Kennedy and the Attorney General’s Referral Authority: A
Blueprint for the Biden Administration, 49 HOFSTRA L. REV. 719, 721 (2021) (noting how the
Trump Administration utilized Attorney General referral to advance an immigration policy
consonant with its campaign promises, including restricting eligibility for asylum, streamlining
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Administration should utilize the authority to implement its preferred
immigration policy within the limits the authority permits. 52
Other Attorneys General have also utilized the referral authority
in a manner that squares with this aspect of the political accountability
theory. A few examples: Attorneys General in the Reagan and Bush
Administrations referred the deportation case of a United Kingdom
citizen based on foreign policy concerns and the impact on the U.S.U.K. relationship; 53 Attorney General Reno referred the Board’s
decision in Matter of R-A-, rejecting the claim of an asylum applicant
that victims of domestic violence constitute a “particular social group,”
based on the concerns of advocates, who had also led the Clinton
Administration to propose rulemaking on the same issue; 54 Attorney
General Mukasey referred a decision on female genital mutilation and
reversed the Board’s restrictive opinion after an outcry from advocates
and direct pleas by lawmakers and advocates to intervene; 55 and
Attorney General Holder remanded a same-sex civil union case for
further proceedings amid the Obama Administration’s deliberations
over whether to continue defending the Defense of Marriage Act. 56
This list is not exhaustive, 57 but it does establish the Attorney General
as the final arbiter in immigration proceedings when necessary to take
into account potential political ramifications of the decision. That it
does not happen more often does not point to a lack of political
accountability in immigration adjudication, but to the fact that that
enforcement and adjudications to limit the possibilities of delay in removal proceedings, and
focusing on detention of aliens both during and after the conclusion of removal proceedings).
52. See generally id. (discussing Biden administration’s policy).
53. See Deportation Proceedings for Joseph Patrick Thomas Doherty, 13 Op. O.L.C. 1, 8
(1989); Deportation Proceedings of Joseph Patrick Thomas Doherty, 12 Op. O.L.C. 1, 8 (1988);
see also Alberto R. Gonzales & Patrick Glen, Advancing Executive Branch Immigration Policy
Through the Attorney General’s Review Authority, 101 IOWA L. REV. 841, 882–86 (2016)
(providing background and context to the Attorney Generals’ decisions in Matter of Doherty).
54. See R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 906 (Att’y Gen. 2001); see also Gonzales & Glen, supra
note 53, at 886–89 (providing background and context to the Attorney General’s decision in
Matter of R-A-).
55. See A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 617, 617 (Att’y Gen. 2008); see also Gonzales & Glen, supra
note 53, at 861–63 (providing background and context to the Attorney General’s decision in
Matter of A-T-).
56. See Dorman, 25 I. & N. Dec. 485, 485 (Att’y Gen. 2011); see also Glen, supra note 51, at
760–71 (providing background and context to the Attorney General’s decision in Matter of
Dorman).
57. For more on the history of Attorney General’s decisions, see generally Gonzales &
Glen, supra note 53 (focusing on decisions issued in the Bush II and Obama administrations, with
reference to additional decisions in the Reagan, Bush I, and Clinton administrations); Glen, supra
note 51, at 726–63 (addressing the decisions issued during the Kennedy, Clinton, and Obama
administrations).
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adjudication—unlike other areas of administrative law—rarely
implicates questions that would place the need for political
accountability front and center.
In the course of conducting these adjudications, the Attorney
General also far more often than not (almost invariably, in fact) meets
the conditions under the “deliberative democracy” conception of
political accountability. When the Attorney General accepts a case on
referral, briefing from the parties is normally contemplated, and
immigration advocates have usually been invited to participate as
amici, as well. 58 This is not a regulatory requirement, nor does every
case elicit a request for responses from the parties. But in those cases
where such briefs are solicited (the overwhelming majority), it is
difficult to see why that public invitation and the briefing it may prompt
is substantially less important from a participatory point of view than
the publication of a proposed rule with its own invitation for
comments. This process also has sufficient transparency. The public is
not privy to the decision-making process of the Attorney General in
the course of rendering his decision on a referred case, but neither is it
privy to the consideration of submitted comments and what responses
they may trigger from the interested agencies engaged in a rulemaking.
In both cases, the public does see the final result—the Attorney
General’s decision with arguments accepted or rejected and the
reasoning for the relevant determinations, and the Final Rule with
comments noted and the agencies’ response memorialized—but in
neither is there any significant transparency concerning how the agency
arrived at that final determination.
C. The Expertise of the Board of Immigration Appeals
The Professors also fault the agency for a lack of relevant
“expertise” for Chevron purposes. 59 Although there is some force to
aspects of their argument—scientific knowledge and expertise may be
entirely lacking in the immigration context, and technical expertise,

58. See In re Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 187, 187 (Att’y Gen. 2018) (referring the case,
directing briefing on specific issues, and inviting “interested amici to submit briefs”); In re A-B-,
27 I. & N. Dec. 227, 227 (Att’y Gen. 2018) (same); In re L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 245, 245 (Att’y
Gen. 2018) (same); In re M-G-G-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 469, 469 (Att’y Gen. 2018) (same); M-S-, 27 I.
& N. Dec. 476, 476 (Att’y Gen. 2018) (same); In re Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. 481, 481 (Att’y Gen.
2018) (same); In re L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 494, 494 (Att’y Gen. 2018) (same); In re CastilloPerez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 495, 495 (Att’y Gen. 2018) (same); In re Thomas & Thompson, 27 I. & N.
Dec. 556, 556 (Att’y Gen. 2019) (same); In re Reyes, 27 I. & N. Dec. 708, 708 (Att’y Gen. 2019)
(same); In re A-M-R-C-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 7, 7 (Att’y Gen. 2020) (same).
59. See Wadhia & Walker, supra note 1, at 1215–24.
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too, may be less important than in other areas, other aspects seem
incomplete or wrong. Here, I deal with two issues: first, the concept of
“legislative expertise,” the expertise the agency obtains through its
interactions with the legislative branch in the course of revising the
statute, and which, in my (perhaps idiosyncratic) conception, the Board
does possess; and second, “craft expertise,” the expertise the agency
obtains through its focus on resolving issues under a particular statute,
and which, given the case flows through the agency, the Board could
be expected to have in spades. 60
First, the Professors argue that the Board lacks “[l]egislative
[e]xpertise,” defined as “the expertise derived from the principal-agent
relationship between Congress and the agency.” 61 The Professors
contend that “[t]his specialized knowledge of legislative purpose and
process should only matter, from a Chevron-expertise perspective, if
the agency statutory interpreter possesses that expertise—either
directly because the interpreter helped draft the statute or indirectly
because the interpreter interacts with the agency personnel who
possess that expertise.” 62 There is no question that Board members do
not themselves assist with the drafting or review of legislation, and no
reason to believe they have any interactions with agency personnel that
do, so in one sense there is force to the Professors’ argument.
But the concept of “legislative expertise” is given too-narrow a
definition in the Professors’ argument. In a more fundamental sense,
the Board does have important insights into relevant legislative policies
and purposes, because immigration enactments have largely unfolded
in the past three to four decades as a complicated case of action and
reaction, with the Board and courts of appeals constituting the “action”
60. Although not a central focus of their argument, the Professors also argue that no “legal
or policy expertise in immigration or foreign relations” is required to become a member of the
Board. See Wadhia & Walker, supra note 1, at 1217–19. That is true in one sense, as a lack of such
knowledge is not disqualifying, but untrue in another, as subject-matter expertise is an important
part of the application process—a fact borne out by the complete job announcement that the
Professors
refer
to
only
in
part.
See
Immigration
Judge,
USAJOBS,
https://www.usajobs.gov/Get/Job?viewDetails/570894500 [https://perma.cc/ZU5H-49D7] (noting
the requirement that applicants respond to the Quality Rating Factors, including “knowledge of
immigration laws and procedures”). It is also worth noting that new hires are tested prior to the
commencement of adjudicatory activities, ensuring there is a baseline of subject-matter specific
expertise. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(b)(1)(vi) (2021). Both Board members and immigration judges
are required to undertake ongoing training “to promote the quality and consistency of
adjudications.” See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.0(b)(1)(vii), 1003.1(a)(2)(i)(B) (2021). And throughout their
time as adjudicators, Board members are assessed and evaluated to ensure they are properly
discharging the functions of the office. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.0(b)(1)(vi), 1003.1(a)(2)(i)(D) (2021).
61. See Wadhia & Walker, supra note 1, at 1221.
62. Id. at 1222.
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and Congress providing the “reaction.” The major amendments to the
asylum statute made by the REAL ID Act of 2005, for instance,
including new provisions relating to the burden of proof, credibility
assessments, and corroboration requirements, were meant to codify
existing Board standards as against contrary precedent in the Ninth
Circuit. 63 Now that Congress has looked to the Board itself for the
statement of the proper standards, who is better than the Board to
interpret any gaps or ambiguities left in those provisions? And, in fact,
knowledge of this legislative background—the rules Congress wanted
to reject and the policies it was interested in advancing—has informed
the Board’s interpretation of these provisions, and produced exactly
the type of decision that should qualify for deference under the terms
of Chevron. 64
The REAL ID Act is not an isolated instance, either. In the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), 65
Congress made numerous changes to the INA premised on issues that
arose through administrative and federal litigation, including:
amending the definition of conviction to adopt certain aspects of the
Board’s prevailing definition, while rejecting others; 66 eliminating
suspension of deportation and replacing it with cancellation of
removal, including a heightened hardship standard deemed necessary
because of lax application of the prior “extreme hardship” standard;67
and clarifying certain issues relating to when a qualifying relationship
must exist for purposes of certain waivers of inadmissibility. 68 In other
words, the base-line for many of the shifts in IIRIRA was Board
precedent, and thus the Board is well-placed to understand: 1) what the
63. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-72, at 161–69 (2005) (Conf. Rep.).
64. See, e.g., Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 516, 518–24 (BIA 2015) (interpreting the
REAL ID Act’s corroboration requirement in light of its professed purpose of rejecting contrary
court of appeals’ precedent and adopting the Board’s rule); Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 341,
343–48 (BIA 2010) (applying a similar reasoning in regard to the REAL ID Act’s amendments
to the statutory burden-of-proof provisions for asylum and withholding of removal).
65. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. ch. 12).
66. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 223–24 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (citing Matter of Esposito, 21
I. & N. Dec. 1 (BIA 1995); Matter of Castro, 19 I. & N. Dec. 692 (BIA 1988); Matter of Ozkok,
19 I. & N. Dec. 546 (BIA 1988)).
67. H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 213–14 (citing Matter of O-J-O-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 381 (BIA
1996)); see Patrick J. Glen & Alanna R. Kennedy, The Strange and Unexpected Afterlife of Pereira
v. Sessions, 34 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 10–12 (2019) (recounting changes to the discretionary-relief
regime made by IIRIRA).
68. H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 228 (citing Matter of Farias, 21 I. & N. Dec. 269 (BIA 1996));
see Glen, supra note 51, at 750–51 (noting IIRIRA’s reversal of Matter of Farias); Gonzales &
Glen, supra note 53, at 890 (same).
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prior rule was; 2) how Congress altered that rule; and 3) what that
alteration means for purposes of a permissible interpretation going
forward. 69 This of course tracks quite nicely with the concept of
“legislative experience” offered by the authors. Their error, it seems to
me, was reading that concept too narrowly to exclude the institutional
knowledge the agency has by virtue of its central interpretive role in
the relevant statutory scheme.
Second, the Professors posit the possibility that the Board may
possess “craft expertise,” relying on the work of Professor Sidney
Shapiro. 70 Professor Shapiro advances a conception of “institutional
expertise,” tied to the “unique wisdom of [the] regulatory agency,” and
ultimately premised on “experience” rather than “formal
knowledge.” 71 With tens of thousands of appeals resolved each year,
the Board could be expected to possess “craft expertise” in spades, and
in fact, Professor Wadhia and Walker feint in that direction initially.72
Ultimately, they conclude that the issue of craft expertise does not
weigh in the Board’s favor for two reasons: 1) statutory ambiguities in
the INA rarely implicate the foundational issues of expertise relevant
to the concept; and 2) even if the Board does possess some craft
expertise, it is a lesser form of expertise compared to that of other
agency actors in the rulemaking process. 73
Fairly construed, the calculus seems to weigh in the other
direction. By dint of resolving tens of thousands of cases annually,
presenting variations on a relatively firm set of themes, the Board does
augment its understanding of the immigration laws generally, as well
as how they specifically apply to certain circumstances. Considering the

69. See, e.g., Matter of Cardenas-Abreu, 24 I. & N. Dec. 795, 796–802 (BIA 2009) (en banc)
(interpreting IIRIRA’s statutory enactment of a definition for the term “convicted” in light of
pre-1996 Board and federal court precedent, as well as legislative intent); Matter of MonrealAguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 58–63 (BIA 2001) (en banc) (interpreting the new “exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship” requirement for cancellation of removal in light of the prior
suspension-of-deportation standard and evident congressional intent in heightening the various
eligibility criteria for discretionary relief from removal in IIRIRA).
70. See Wadhia & Walker, supra note 1, at 1217, 1223–24.
71. Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure to Understand Expertise in Administrative Law: The
Problem and the Consequences, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1097, 1099 (2015).
72. See Wadhia & Walker, supra note 1, at 1223 (noting that BIA members become
specialists on immigration law by interpreting INA and immigration policies. Compared to
federal judges, the agency developed “expertise in reconciling and accounting for conflicting
evidence and arguments, disciplinary perspectives, political demands, and legal commands.”
(citation omitted)).
73. Id. at 1223–24.
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concept of “particular social group” in the refugee definition, 74 for
instance, the Board may hone its understanding of the general concept
as the issue is raised across a variety of circumstances, while also
sharpening its application to specifics that may be presented over and
over again. By having to resolve the question repeatedly, the Board’s
expertise as a general and specific matter begins to far outstrip other
actors in the bureaucracy. It may be true that some questions do not
implicate technical or scientific expertise, but many, if not most, that
are resolved through precedential decision-making will involve matters
peculiar to the agency’s institutional mission, like the “particular social
group” interpretation noted above. In cases where the Board issues a
precedential decision, that decision is likely the end product of having
considered the issue in hundreds, thousands, or even tens of thousands
of other cases, with the precedent-setting decision marking the
culmination of this expansive decisional process. Not only does the
Board possess the institutional expertise posited by Professor Shapiro,
because of the sheer breadth of its workload, but it is also difficult to
imagine an agency that could claim greater “craft expertise.”
The comparative expertise argument also seems weak. The
Professors do note that the focus of the Board on immigration issues
and the stream of cases means that the agency possesses greater
comparative expertise than the federal courts. 75 But there is little
reason to believe that the Board does not also possess greater “craft
expertise” than other agency experts. Again tying this to work-flow,
the Board will have seen a particular issue raised in virtually every
possible circumstance in which it can be raised, giving it a more
expansive view of the legal playing field than other experts tied solely
to the language of the statute or legal imagination. Given the number
of cases decided by immigration judges, and the possibilities of the full
panoply of issues under the INA being appealed to the Board, it is the
Board that has the most comprehensive view of immigration law of
virtually any actor in the field. The number of appeals considered and
resolved each year, and the range of issues presented therein, dwarf the
scope of rulemaking. In other words, if there is institutional expertise
borne of practice, the Board can comfortably claim that mantle in the
immigration context.

74.
137.
75.

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 1(A)(2), July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
See Wadhia & Walker, supra note 1, at 1223.
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III. RULEMAKING VERSUS ADJUDICATION
The Professors’ arguments against Chevron deference to
immigration adjudications are not free-standing attacks against the
concept, but rather the framework they utilize to advance their main
normative argument: that at least so far as immigration policy-making
is concerned, the agencies should categorically prefer rulemaking to
adjudication. 76 For me, because I do not believe in the strength of their
arguments against the applicability of Chevron deference to
immigration adjudications, I remain at best agnostic about the choice
between adjudication and rulemaking. But I also believe that, even on
its own terms, the Professors’ argument relies on an idealized
conception of rulemaking when, in reality, the purported gulf between
the desirability of these options is substantially narrower (or nonexistent).
At the threshold, there is no question—and the Professors do not
argue to the contrary—that when given the choice to proceed via
rulemaking or adjudication, the choice is entirely within the discretion
of the agency. 77 Likewise, under controlling precedent, deference is
warranted in either case, so long as the agency is fulfilling its statutory
mandate and Congress has not unambiguously foreclosed the
interpretation or decision made by the agency. 78 The provision of this
choice makes sense, as some issues may be amenable to either
rulemaking or adjudication, for others, there are considerations that
may weigh more heavily in favor of the one rather than the other, and
for still others, the choice may be directed by statute or the nature of
the policy question being resolved.
Using just the asylum statute as an example, all these dynamics
can be seen at work. The Attorney General may, “by regulation,”
“designate . . . offenses that will be considered to be” disqualifying
particularly serious crimes or serious nonpolitical crimes for purposes
of asylum eligibility; 79 he “may . . . establish additional limitations and
76. See id. at 1202–03.
77. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (“[T]he choice made between
proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the
informed discretion of the administrative agency.”); FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436
U.S. 775, 808 n.29 (1978) (“The Commission has substantial discretion as to whether to proceed
by rulemaking or adjudication.” (citation omitted)).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (“We have recognized a
very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment in express congressional
authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations
or rulings for which deference is claimed.”) (emphasis added).
79. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).
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conditions . . . under which an alien shall be ineligible for asylum”; 80
and he “may provide . . . other conditions or limitations on the
consideration of an application for asylum.” 81 He also “shall establish
a procedure for the consideration of asylum applications filed under”
the statute. 82 These are issues that by their nature or by specific
direction of the statute must be resolved via rulemaking. In contrast,
the definition of “particular social group,” one of the statutorily
protected grounds on which basis an alien may assert eligibility for
asylum, is an issue that would be amenable to either rulemaking or
adjudication. The Board has established broad criteria to consider in
assessing whether a particular social group qualifies as such, 83 but it is
possible that such criteria could have been promulgated via regulation,
as well. No final rule on “particular social groups” has ever been
promulgated, but the Clinton Administration did issue a draft rule that
would have addressed some of these questions. 84 In contrast with the
initial examples in this paragraph, however, there is nothing about
resolving the ambiguity inherent in the term “particular social group”
that makes rulemaking or adjudication the preferred course of action.
Over the better part of four decades, the Board has, through
adjudication, provided an interpretation of that term to guide
determinations of when a “particular social group” may qualify under
the statute, and has applied that definition in precedential decisions to
render broadly applicable holdings regarding frequently raised
“particular social groups.” 85 The same goals could have been achieved
through the rulemaking process, but that process would not have
provided any better avenue for issuing Executive Branch policy on the
question. Either forum allows complete consideration of the important
issues and final resolution of the questions so that the law may be
applied to future cases. In short, policy could be established through
either mechanism. But then consider application of that generally
promulgated framework to specific proposed social groups, whether it
is victims of domestic abuse, the nuclear family, former gang members,
80. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(C).
81. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(B).
82. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(1).
83. See M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 227 (BIA 2014); W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 208
(BIA 2014).
84. See generally Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,593–95 (Dec.
7, 2000) (proposing standards to govern when an alleged particular social group is cognoscible
under the INA).
85. See cases cited in supra note 83 (listing the Board’s most recent decisions on how and
when a “particular social group” may be established, including historical overviews of the Board’s
development of the “particular social group” analysis).
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or wealthy returning deportees. Rulemaking cannot exhaustively
address each and every conceivable proposed social group, even if it
could establish the parameters for considering when such a group could
be recognized. 86 Instead, adjudication, by considering each question on
a case-by-case basis, can provide greater form and context for
interpretation of the ambiguous term, and in so doing should be
entitled to deference consistent with the Supreme Court’s direction in
cases such as Cardoza-Fonseca and Aguirre-Aguirre. 87
Presenting rulemaking as an all-or-nothing option if an agency
wants to obtain deference on review fails to take into account these
differences inherent in the multitude of issues raised before and
considered by agencies. At the very least, failing to meaningfully
grapple with these questions undercuts the force of the Professors
adamant turn to rulemaking in the immigration context. To be sure, on
one level the question is not the choice itself but the result of that
choice, and even there the Professors’ argument resorts to the
extension of some deference (just not Chevron). 88 Regardless of these
points, however, the end result is the same: for the agencies’ policy
choices to receive the deference due to them under Chevron, they must
proceed through rulemaking to the exclusion of adjudication.
Despite the foregoing, the Professors’ Manichean approach might
make sense if rulemaking were some sort of panacea for all the ills they
raise regarding immigration adjudication. On a clear-eyed view,
though, it is not. The shortcomings of rulemaking may be different in
kind or scope than those of adjudication, but they are shortcomings
nonetheless. The concerns noted by the Professors ultimately provide
no support for their aggressive argument in favor of rulemaking.
Returning, first, to the question of expertise; in arguing against
relevant expertise by agency adjudicators, the Professors framed that
perceived lack against the greater benefits of expertise offered by other
86. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (explaining that not every principle
can be immediately formed as a general rule because “[s]ome principles must await their own
development, while others must be adjusted to meet particular, unforeseeable situations[,]” and
therefore, concluding that “an administrative agency must be equipped to act either by general
rule or by individual order. To insist upon one form of action to the exclusion of the other is to
exalt form over necessity”).
87. See Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987)
(“There is obviously some ambiguity in a term like ‘well-founded fear’ which can only be given
concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication. In that process . . . the courts
must respect the interpretation of the agency . . . .” (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted)); Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (adopting
a similar reasoning).
88. See, e.g., Wadhia & Walker, supra note 1, at 1241.
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individuals within the subject agencies. 89 The question of comparative
expertise seems closer to a wash, however. There are undoubtedly
other experts at EOIR, DHS, and DOJ, who have meaningful
contributions to make in the course of rulemaking (as well as the
antecedent step of statutory revision and drafting), but there is little
reason to view any of these discrete experts as in possession of
substantially more knowledge than the adjudicators and their
adjutants. Regarding the aggregation of expertise, in the course of
rulemaking the agencies may benefit from multiple different
viewpoints being brought to bear on a single problem—EOIR may be
able to explain adjudicative issues posed by the rule, DHS operational
impact, and DOJ potential litigation fall-out. 90 Here, the benefits of
rulemaking in the abstract may seem formidable, but with any
precedential decision the Board will have the views of its own expert
members, the staff of EOIR who work for the Board, and the views of
DHS via briefing and possibly argument. The slate of experts available
to the Board is certainly less than what would be available to the
administration via rulemaking, but this should also be considered
within the scope of the decisions being rendered. As explained above,
issues that are peculiarly subject to adjudication are also substantially
less likely to benefit from the kind of aggregation of expertise
encouraged by the rulemaking process. Interpreting the term
“particular social group” and applying that definition in specific cases
as aliens proffer a range of purported social groups is of a different kind
of exercise than promulgating procedures to guide the filing and
consideration of asylum applications. The former issues present
questions of adjudicatory expertise that are dependent on the Board’s
consistent engagement with both the general statute and specific
questions that arise under the statute, whereas the latter issue presents
more purely institutional questions where the aggregation of agency
expertise may likely contribute to the development of an optimal
regulation. The aggregation issue arises only through posing a false
equivalency between issues considered in rulemaking and those
considered in adjudication.
The nature of expertise is also a tricky concept in this area. As I
argue above, I believe that the Board has substantial institutional
expertise that arises because of the impetus behind much of Congress’s

89. See id. at 1221–24 (focusing on the expertise of agency personnel directly involved with
the drafting and consideration of legislation on behalf of the Executive Branch).
90. See id. at 1222.
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reforms over the past decades. 91 Those reforms have occurred with
Board precedent in mind, and thus the Board is peculiarly well-placed
to understand what Congress was doing and why. I also agree with the
Professors, however, that others within the immigration bureaucracy
may have important contributions to make regarding the same
question. 92 The Professors note in this regard the Board’s inability to
access this expertise because of the ethical and practical barriers that
often exist between the agency adjudicator and other government
policy-makers, 93 and use that fact as an argument against deference to
the Board itself. 94 But if that wall is blocking a flow of information, it
is blocking that flow from both directions. The Board may not have
access to other experts’ views, but then those same experts do not have
access to the Board’s own expert views and what could be its singular
insights into the motivating factors of statutory amendments. Where
the Professors see only a shortcoming insofar as the Board itself is
concerned, I see a two-way street whereby experts engaged in
rulemaking have only a limited universe of expertise to consider, while
the Board itself has only a slightly differently constituted limited
universe of expertise to consider. Both procedures lack something, and
given that—along with my more generally supportive views of Board
expertise in the course of adjudication—I can find no expertise-based
reason to categorically prefer rulemaking while withdrawing
adjudication from the scope of Chevron deference.
Political accountability also seems more or less a wash. Given the
possibilities of Attorney General referral, adjudication via that avenue
provides as much political accountability as does Executive agency
rulemaking. 95 In both cases, voters know where the buck has stopped.
I also disagree that rulemaking is inherently preferable from the
perspective of public participation. Here, the Professors are quite
bullish on the benefits of rulemaking, which seem superficially clear: a
rule is proposed, the public is invited to review and comment, and the
administration then considers the comments (sometimes in the
hundreds of thousands) individually (!) and drafts a final rule taking
into consideration all these concerns and comments. The notion that
this process is actually engaged in soliciting and considering public
views to the ends of altering the agencies’ preferred rules is at best in
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See supra Part II.C.
Wadhia & Walker, supra note 1, at 1222.
Id.
Id. at 1222–23.
See supra Part II.B.
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tension with reality. Writing in an earlier version of the Duke
Administrative Law Symposium, Professor E. Donald Elliott, formerly
a Public Member of the Administrative Conference of the United
States and Assistant Administrator and General Counsel of the
Environmental Protection Agency, remarked that “[n]o administrator
in Washington turns to full-scale notice-and-comment rulemaking
when she is genuinely interested in obtaining input from interested
parties.” 96 No doubt informed by his own personal experience,
Professor Elliott offered a telling simile: “Notice-and-comment
rulemaking is to public participation as Japanese Kabuki theater is to
human passions—a highly stylized process for displaying in a formal
way the essence of something which in real life takes place in other
venues.” 97 This is not to say that rulemaking is not informed by public
concerns as well as interested constituents, but only that that process is
not likely to occur within the confines of rulemaking itself. 98 The
notice-and-comment process is now quite formal and driven by
compliance with statutory standards, and the bare-fact of meeting
those standards (while also compiling the record on which the rule will
be defended in the federal courts)—not “provid[ing] . . . public input
into government thinking—is the “primary[]” function of the process.99

96. E. Donald Elliot, Re-inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492 (1992); see David
J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 231–32
(2001) (“The more courts have required agencies to give detailed notice of proposed regulatory
action to interest groups, the more pressure agencies have felt to complete the bulk of their work
prior to the onset of the rulemaking process . . . the less flexibility they show during rulemaking.”);
see also Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical
Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 123 (2011) (“The findings
of this study [on the EPA’s adoption of the air toxic emissions standards] underscore both the
accuracy and the importance of Professor Elliott’s remarks . . . [it] reinforce[s] the possibility that
a great deal of interest group influence occurs outside of the glass box of notice and comment.”).
97. Elliot, supra note 96, at 1492; see Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency: Theory
Maintenance and Administrative Rulemaking, 63 PITT. L. REV. 589, 597 (2002) (“The timing of
rulemaking encourages agency lock-in by concentrating the bulk of decisionmaking in the prenotice period. Notice occurs after the agency has completed substantial amounts of development,
analysis, and review.”); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1775 (1975) (“Indeed, the content of rulemaking decisions is often largely
determined in advance through a process of informal consultation in which organized interests
may enjoy a preponderant influence.”).
98. Elliot, supra note 96, at 1492–93 (listing several methods to secure public participation:
“[F]rom informal meetings with trade associations and other constituency groups, to roundtables,
to floating ‘trial balloons’ in speeches or leaks to the trade press, to the more formal techniques
of advisory committees and negotiated rulemaking”).
99. Id. at 1493; see Jud Mathews, Minimally Democratic Administrative Law, 68 ADMIN. L.
REV. 605, 636 (2016) (noting divergence between “the justifications that they will believe satisfy
courts” and “the agency’s real reasons for acting” and concluding that “demanding judicial review
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A comparison of those parties submitting comments to the prior
administration in the immigration rulemaking context would, I would
wager, align highly with the interested amici submitting briefs before
the Attorney General in referred cases. Professor Wadhia specifically
has been an active amicus participant in immigration cases before the
Supreme Court, federal courts of appeals, and district courts. 100 Why is
the latter form of participation dramatically different from the former?
The Professors do not pose this question and thus do not answer it, but
it is worth considering. If the essence of the public-participation
argument is the ability to be heard, the opportunities are similar as
between rulemaking and adjudication in that narrow class of case that
will prompt a decision entitled to deference on review. The
opportunities are not identical, and I do not mean to argue to the
contrary—the Board and Attorney General may decide cases without
amicus participation or additional briefing from the parties. But fairly
considered, the opportunities to participate in those adjudications that
will lead to a precedential decision are more robust and important than
the Professors acknowledge, while their own preferred course of
rulemaking contains only a formalized mechanism of public
participation whose actual substantive importance is open to debate.
All this is to say only that rulemaking has its own warts. It is a
necessary mechanism for adopting certain policies, and the route that
should be preferred in other classes of cases, as well. But it is not
without its own shortcomings, including as to expertise, accountability,
and participation, and the Professors fail to advance any compelling
reason for categorically preferring rulemaking to adjudication in the
advancement of administration policy, much less an argument for why
we should continue to confer deference on rulemakings while
withdrawing it from adjudications.
IV. RESPONSIBILITY FOR AND THE LIKELY OUTCOME OF
CHEVRON’S RECALIBRATION
This leaves possibilities for reform—assuming Chevron should be
recalibrated for purposes of immigration adjudication, how should that

standards contribute to the ossification of the rulemaking process, generating delays and reducing
agencies’ functional rulemaking capacity”).
100. See, e.g., Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Symposium: Reflections on the Travel Ban Decision,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2018, 5:02 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposiumreflections-on-the-travel-ban-decision [https://perma.cc/WL5S-VS9W] (noting that Professor
Wadhia co-authored an amicus brief for scholars of immigration law on the history of the
Immigration and Nationality Act in support of Hawaii in Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 2392 (2018)).

2021]

THE CASE FOR CHEVRON

43

recalibration be accomplished? First, if Congress wants to eliminate
deference for all administrative cases or any subset thereof, there is no
obvious impediment to that action, although I share the Professors’
skepticism that any substantial reform to deference principles will
come through legislation. 101 The Professors do note the possibility of
comprehensive immigration reform in the Biden Administration, and
this well may provide an avenue to action on the specific question of
deference. But it additionally opens the door to other ways to cut back
on the circumstances where such deference is relevant—revising the
INA or enacting new provisions that more particularly and explicitly
address the relevant questions rather than more open-ended provisions
leaving interpretive discretion with the agency. Eliminating or cutting
back on the chances an agency would have to render an interpretation
ultimately entitled to deference before the federal courts is as wise a
move towards “mitigating” deference’s reign as would be a wholesale
revocation of deference.
Second, perhaps most provocatively, the Professors argue for the
Executive Branch to take the lead by waiving deference in immigration
adjudications and “shifting major immigration policymaking away
from adjudication and into the realm of notice-and-comment
rulemaking.” 102 For support, they note a recent regulation limiting the
circumstances where the Department of Justice will seek deference in
the wake of Kisor v. Wilkie’s 103 reconceptualization of Auer
deference. 104 I would assume there is no barrier to the Department also
doing so in the context of Chevron deference and defense of
immigration adjudications. But the Professors miss an important point
in citing this regulation—the Department sought to ensure that its
litigation unfolded consistent with governing Supreme Court law, and
did not push the boundaries by asking for deference to guidance and
internal documents that otherwise would not warrant deference. That
argument is entirely lacking here—the Supreme Court has consistently
and emphatically described immigration adjudication as entitled to
deference on judicial review. In promulgating any contrary
Departmental policy or rule, the Department would not be acting to

101. See Wadhia & Walker, supra note 1, at 1236.
102. Id. at 1241.
103. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
104. Wadhia & Walker, supra note 1, at 1241 (citing Processes and Procedures for Issuance
and Use of Guidance Documents, 85 Fed. Reg. 63,200, 63200–04 (Oct. 7, 2020) (to be codified at
28 C.F.R. pt. 50)).
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ensure compliance with Supreme Court law, but would be itself
catalyzing a shift away from that law.
This also implicates attorney-client obligations. The Department’s
lawyers have higher obligations and duties regarding the rule of law
than private practitioners. 105 This means that in certain circumstances,
the Department will decline to defend otherwise favorable precedent
or may confess error. 106 Along with this obligation, however, is the
Department’s obligation to defend its client-agencies within the limits
permitted by the law. 107 The limits of the law obviously entail not
stretching the text of statutes, regulations, or judicial precedent beyond
their reasonable import, but there can be no colorable argument that
those limits also entail voluntarily declining to seek deference in a class
of adjudications that the Supreme Court has repeatedly told us
warrant deference. If Chevron continues to exist, and its application to
immigration adjudications continues to be sanctioned, there is no legal
rationale to support the Department’s waiver of deference, and any
institutional interests are purely hypothetical. 108
Most importantly, however, voluntary abdication of deference
takes the burden off the entity that should be charged with rethinking
the scope of Chevron: the Supreme Court itself. Deference, as
currently conceptualized, stems from Supreme Court precedent and is
a canon applicable to judicial review of agency action. It is thus with
the judiciary that the mantle of reform must ultimately rest. Unless or
until the Court seeks to alter the deference calculus, the Executive is
entitled to continue to argue for deference consistent with that
precedent. And, of course, this may already be happening in
immigration cases. Former Justice Kennedy criticized the courts of
105. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“The United States Attorney
is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty . . . and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done.”); United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 25 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (noting that the Supreme Court has “long emphasized that a representative of
the United States Government is held to a higher standard of behavior” than private counsel)
(alteration in original).
106. This obviously happens infrequently, and when it does happen the issue is usually not a
substantive interpretation of the agency but a jurisdictional determination by the court of appeals.
See Mata v. Lynch, 576 U.S. 143, 147 (2015) (noting government’s agreement with the petitioner
contra the holding of the court of appeals); Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 241–42 (2010) (same);
see also Abdisalan v. Holder, 774 F.3d 517, 523 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (noting the confluence
of the petitioner’s and government’s arguments on rehearing).
107. See generally Mark B. Stern & Alisa B. Klein, The Government’s Litigator: Taking
Clients Seriously, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1409 (2000) (noting that in representing agencies in the
federal courts, Justice Department litigators are effectively representing “clients”).
108. See, e.g., Wadhia & Walker, supra note 1, at 1241–42.
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appeals reflexive recourse to deference in a recent immigration case,
where Justice Alito, in his solo dissent, argued that the majority’s
decision was an implicit repudiation of Chevron deference. 109 The
Court has also declined to take a position on whether deference is
warranted to immigration adjudications that touch on so-called dualuse statutes, statutes that may entail both civil and criminal
consequences, instead of conducting de novo review of the question
presented. 110 Of course, in the midst of these cases, the Court has
continued to apply Chevron deference. 111 But to the extent there is an
increasing number of cases where the Court balks at that application,
any necessary recalibration is likely already underway.
It is also important to address a question the Professors do not
raise—what is the practical effect if immigration adjudications no
longer qualify for Chevron deference? Presumably, the Professors
would argue that the elimination of deference would be of significant
importance, otherwise there would be little reason to spend 47 pages
arguing for that result in a prestigious law journal. I am skeptical. In
the Supreme Court itself, I see little reason to believe that a lack of
deference will negatively affect the rate at which the government
prevails. First, again, many cases are already resolved without recourse
to Chevron. Second, the cases where Chevron was applied were not
likely to have come out the other way absent a robust conception of
deference. The recently-concluded Supreme Court Term offers some
support for these points. The Court decided five civil immigration
cases, three of which presented some claim to Chevron deference. 112
The Court resolved all five on plain-text grounds, and the government
prevailed in four of the five cases, including two of the three that

109. See Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120–21 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Justice Alito stated in his dissent:
Here, a straightforward application of Chevron requires us to accept the Government’s
construction of the provision at issue. But the Court rejects the Government’s
interpretation in favor of one that it regards as the best reading of the statute. I can
only conclude that the Court, for whatever reason, is simply ignoring Chevron.
Id. at 2121 (Alito, J., dissenting).
110. See Patrick J. Glen & Kate E. Stillman, Chevron Deference or the Rule of Lenity? DualUse Statutes and Judge Sutton’s Lonely Lament, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. FURTHERMORE 129, 133–40
(2016).
111. See Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41, 56–64 (2014) (applying deference to
uphold the Board’s restrictive interpretation of the Child Status Protection Act); Holder v.
Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583, 591 (2012) (applying deference to uphold the Board’s
interpretation of the continuous residence provision of the cancellation-of-removal statute).
112. See Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. 2271, 2291 (2021); Sanchez v. Mayorkas, 141
S. Ct. 1809, 1812 (2021); Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1480 (2021).
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presented the deference question. 113 Folding in an additional criminalimmigration case decided by the Court, and the government had a 5-1
record in immigration cases in the October 2020 Term. 114 A more
robust form of deference may well have led to a win for the government
in the sole case it lost this Term. 115 But that fact does not undermine
the point that plain-text resolutions of immigration issues are often,
even if not invariably, going to coincide with the disposition of the
agency.
The issue may be more complicated in the courts of appeals, but
the Professors certainly do not make any substantial case for a seachange in judicial review of immigration adjudications in a hypothetical
post-Chevron world. The points regarding the Supreme Court are
likely to be just as important in the courts of appeals, i.e., many cases
are already disposed of on non-deference-related grounds, while a
“better-reading” argument will often favor the position advanced by
the government even in the absence of Chevron deference (whether on
de novo review or on application of Skidmore “deference”). Of course,
this may just provide fuel for their argument—if the outcome will not
have catastrophic consequences on the adjudicatory system, why not
jettison deference and give a freer hand to the courts of appeals? That
would be a rational counterpunch. For me, however, it argues for
maintenance of the status quo, especially in these circumstances where
I think most of the criticisms of deference lack strength and the
proposed alternative of rulemaking offers no net benefits.
CONCLUSION
Professors Wadhia and Walker have written a thoughtful critique
of the application of Chevron deference to immigration adjudications,
but for me it ultimately misses the mark. In some sense, I have a dog in
this fight, although my interests are more institutional than substantive.
The actual practice of deference in immigration litigation has not
engendered any significant problems in the four decades since
Chevron, and unreasonable decisions or those prohibited by the plain
language of the statute will be vacated on review. But where there is
ambiguity or room for the agency to make a policy choice, it is entitled
113. Of the cases presenting some form of deference, the government prevailed in Guzman
Chavez, 141 S. Ct. 2271 and Sanchez, 141 S. Ct. 1809, and lost in Niz-Chavez, 141 S. Ct. 1474. The
government additionally prevailed in Garland v. Dai, 141 S. Ct. 1669 (2021), and Pereida v.
Wilkinson, 141 S. Ct. 754 (2021).
114. See United States v. Palomar-Santiago, 141 S. Ct. 1615, 1618 (2021).
115. See Niz-Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 1485.
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to pursue that decision through adjudication. And having done so, the
courts should defer under the long-accepted principles of Chevron.

